By reducing information cost, the internet has ushered in many novel two-sided markets.

Chinese companies try to move up the value chain by buying established brands.

Better information on risky events may lead to market failure due to adverse selection.

Health insurance premiums tend to be high for individual policies because of adverse selection and moral hazard.

Poorly informed consumers usually end up getting stuck with lemon products which are passed around to avoid capital loss.

The prevalence of yes persons is due to the difficulty of objectively assessing the contribution of white-collar work and the bosses’ human desire to hear confirming information.

Too many choices might lead to decision paralysis due to information overload.

Mobile phones that require less fixed investment and maintenance can extend telecommunications to areas that copper wires might have taken decades to reach.

Controlling the distribution of products and the provision of after-sale service considerably reduce free riding of online shoppers on offline stores for product information.

Because well-known brands can signal quality and integrity amid consumer ignorance, brands could stabilize market share and enhance brand-owners' ability to charge premium prices.

Genetic test results on fatal diseases could lead to adverse selection of membership in life and health insurance if unfavorable results are concealed from insurers.

The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh uses joint liability as a screening device to overcome insufficient information on the soundness of individual loan projects and to circumvent the dangers of providing loans without collateral among the poor.

A mistaken identity can confer temporary competitive advantage to a business because of insufficient information on the part of naïve customers.